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Abstract 
This paper  focuses on poverty in the MENA region and whether it can be  
alleviated by intergenerational support within and across households. 
Intergenerational relations are mediated through several institutions. The most 
prominent of these are households, state, civil society and market. 
Combinations of social arrangements, economic resources and cultural 
traditions govern these institutions. Whether or not family and households can 
provide the necessary supports for their poorer or disadvantaged members 
would crucially depend on household composition, its economic resources and 
its interaction with the institutions of state, civil society and market. This paper 
explores the trends in family formation and composition over time and 
household interaction with the above mentioned institutions through the 
labour market, or through various state and NGO driven welfare programmes. 
The above trends as well as migration impact the intergenerational support 
within families. This paper will argue for improved social support and regional 
integration in order to complement family resources as well as tackle some of 
the emerging issues in relation to population ageing and care economy in the 
region.   
Keywords 
MENA, demographic transition, household composition, intergenerational 
support, care economy, gender and care, social policy. 
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Demographic and social trends affecting 
intergenerational relations in the MENA region1 
1 Introduction 
The MENA region has been experiencing two important demographic 
phenomena in the past few decades. One is the gradual and sustained decline 
in fertility and the other is the high rate of migration. Both have focused 
attention on intergenerational linkages at micro/household/family level as well 
as macro and meso social levels. A declining fertility leads to population ageing 
and warrants attention as to the need for long term planning to manage its 
social and economic implications through intergenerational support. Moreover, 
intergenerational support has also come under scrutiny because of the impact 
of the national and international migration on population ageing.  
The backdrop to the changing demography of MENA is the complex set 
of countries in the region that have to develop social and economic policies in 
the next 20 years if they were to be prepared for the challenges of population 
ageing, migration and intergenerational support. This paper will explore some 
of the key social and economic issues facing the region by locating the 
intergenerational support in the broader issue of social production and re-
production and the importance of intergeneration support for it. It would then 
provide an overview of some of the key demographic developments such as 
fertility and mortality decline, demographic transition, family formation and 
migration. Finally, broad policy options for managing the intergenerational 
relationship and the more general welfare issues in the face of demographic 
changes in the region and levels of economic and social resources available in 
different countries.  
2 Generations and inter-generational support and why it 
matters 
Production and re-production are at the heart of economic and social life of 
any society. Historical developments and resource base shape the way a 
society’s production and re-production are organized, which is about the 
relationship between generations at micro and macro levels. Inter-generational 
relationship is by definition social, and it is this social relation that shapes the 
social production and re-production of the society. Any society has to 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank the Qatar Foundation for organizing the conference. 
“Protecting Arab family from poverty: employment, social integration and 
intergenerational solidarity” (Doha, 2-3 June 2013) and inviting the author to present 
this paper. May I thank Ms Amina Mesdoua for her efficient organization and 
encouragement to write this paper. I would also like those present at the conference 
for their comments during the presentation of an earlier draft. Finally, this paper 
draws on my earlier works on employment, poverty and social policy in the MENA 
region.   
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produce/generate itself economic and social level (including cultural 
production) whilst to ensure its survival it has to be re-produced as well.  
The economic and productive system of any society will bring together its 
productive forces of, for example, labour, land and other natural resources as 
well as capital. That requires social relations among different groups of 
population.  An important aspect of social relations is property rights that 
govern the ownership of means of production and organise the relationship 
between different classes and groups of people, some of whom own the means 
of production and others that do not. And that sets the foundation for 
different claims over the output produced. In other words, distribution of 
national income is in principle an outcome of the property rights over 
resources of the economy. Since the industrial revolution, the development of 
capitalist relations and the emergence of nation states all countries use a mix of 
market and state control to organise their production and distribution. The 
reasons for the development of and the balance between market and state 
control does not concern us here, but it is important to note that an 
understanding of generational issues in terms of ‘production’ and ‘re-
production’ of labour and access to resources, through distribution of output 
and inheritance rights are crucial for the analysis of economic and social 
relations.  
In any economic and social system the interaction between generations 
takes place in private (at the level of household and family) and public spheres 
(at the level of different communities and nation). The two spheres build and 
dependent on each other. 
For example national tax and subsidy policies affect household income 
and capacity to take care of its members. On the other hand and more 
important, it is the private sphere that act as the foundation of public sphere. 
Production and maintenance of labour power through, for example, child 
bearing and child care, and reproduction of labour through food production at 
home and care of the sick, as well as the social reproduction through transfer 
of social norms, cultures and mores of society. (Cole and Durham, 2007) As 
Elson (1994) observed: “The ability of money to mobilise labour power for 
‘productive work’ [paid by the market] depends on the operation of some non-
monetary set of social relations to mobilise labour power for reproductive 
work.” (p. 40). Unpaid labour at home then becomes the backdrop to the paid 
work in the market that acknowledges the unpaid (mostly) female labour, albeit 
indirectly, through the notion of a ‘family wage.’  
The concept of generation has several dimensions, one of which is the 
commonly noted dimension of time (age) as reflected in the categories of 
childhood, adulthood and old age. These categories are to some extent driven 
by the biological cycle of human development, for example the onset of 
puberty, but of more interest are the socially driven dimension of age such as 
the rite of passage into adulthood, marriage, work related events such as 
retirement, common experience (e.g. military service, education), etc. These 
experiences shape a generation and are important to the production and re-
production/regeneration of cultural norms and mores, as one generation 
transmits its culture to another.  This transmission is about continuity and 
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change at the same time, as much as the transition from a ‘traditional’ to 
‘modern’ society is about change that often maintains links to the past. It is the 
balance between this continuity and change that is going to define the future of 
inter-generational relationship in the MENA region.  
The next section will be dealing with some of the long-term implications 
of the changing demography of the MENA. 
3 Generations and demographic change in MENA 
Several major developments are changing the demography of the MENA 
countries which are now at different phases of their demographic transition. 
Earlier mortality decline followed by fertility decline have led to a gradual 
decline in the rate of population growth in the region that however varies 
across countries. (Roudi-Fahimi and Mederios, 2007) Yet earlier high growth 
of population has resulted in a young age structure (those in 15-24 age group 
constitute about 20 per cent of population in the region) that has ensured a 
growing population despite a declining fertility rate across the region. By 2050 
most countries in the region are forecast to have anywhere between 1.3 to 1.7 
times more people than in 2007. Life expectancy in the region has also 
increased to 70-73 years in most countries in the region. (UN, 2013) 
Other notable demographic changes are related to family formation and 
migration. The region has witnessed an increase in the use of modern 
contraceptives, increase in age of marriage and a reduction in family size. The 
increase in age of marriage has been attributed to the rising cost of setting up a 
home, mainly due to rising property prices, high unemployment among the 
young people and high incidence of poverty among the working population. 
Among other reasons for late marriage is the increased autonomy of women, 
due to their increased educational level. (Roudi-Fahimi and Mederios, 2007) 
Family size in the region has decreased to 5.4 in urban and 6.1 in rural 
areas, with the family size decreasing with the increase in the education of the 
head of family. Moreover, family size is even smaller in nuclear families – 4.7 
persons per nuclear family. Nuclear families comprise 85 per cent of all 
families in the region. A further development is the number of children per 
family that in urban areas stands at 2.4 and in rural areas at 3, that again 
declines with the increase the education of the head of family. In the 
foreseeable future the family size is going to be stable given the combined 
effects of declining mortality and fertility moving in the opposite direction. 
These developments combined with the rising age of marriage and high youth 
unemployment ensures that there would be more adults at home, resulting in a 
stable dependency ratio. (Bongaart, 2001) 
These changes are in line with the developments in other parts of the 
world. (See table 1 below) The trend towards smaller families in developing 
regions follows the pattern observed in the developed countries in the 19th 
century, that has been attributed to adoption of some older methods family 
planning, urbanization (associated with lower fertility and mortality over time), 
‘modernisation’ of life style and the move towards nuclear families, and above 
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all the development of capitalism and its associated work patterns and family 
formation. (Bongaart, 2001, and Seccombe, 1983) 
Table 1 
Family size and number of children in developing regions 
by area of residence and education of head of family. (1980s) 
 
Residence Head of family Education 
 
Urban Rural None Primary Secondary 
Asia 4.9 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.2 
L. America 4.6 5.0 4.7 5 4.4 
Near E./N. Africa 5.4 6.1 5.9 5.7 5.0 
S.S. Africa 5.1 5.3 5.2 5.3 5.0 
Number of Children 
     
Asia 2.0 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.3 
L. America 1.9 2.5 2.1 2.3 1.9 
Near E./N. Africa 2.4 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.3 
S.S. Africa 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.5 
Source: Adapted from Bongaart (2001), table 4, based on Demographic Health Surveys (1990). 
HS data files. 
 
The last major demographic development in the region is migration and 
movement of labour, which crucially depends on the resource base of different 
countries. Despite popular perceptions, the region is quite heterogeneous in 
terms of resources, social and economic history. According to Richards and 
Waterbury (1996), MENA countries can be divided into several groups based 
on their natural and human resources. The first are the small countries that are 
very rich in oil or gas such as Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE or have limited oil 
reserves like Oman and Bahrain. These have very small markets and little 
resources to diversify their economies, notwithstanding the fact that Dubai in 
UAE has been successful in developing a vibrant entrepot sector and, more 
recently, a tourist industry. Immigrant labour from poorer countries of the 
region as well as the Indian subcontinent has been key to the development of 
these sectors in Dubai as well as the economy of this group of countries. Then 
comes the oil industrialising countries of Iran, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq 
(whose fortune has dramatically changed since the US led invasion in March 
2003) that have substantial oil reserves and other natural resources as well as 
sufficiently large population allowing them to diversify their economies. Iran 
and Algeria have been more successful industrialisers than other countries in 
this group though they still rely heavily on oil for their export earnings. The 
third group consists of the ‘small’ natural resource poor countries of Israel, 
9 
 
Jordan, Syria and Tunisia that have been relatively successful in diversifying 
their economies through education and skill development and developing a 
sizable manufacturing sector. The fourth group includes the newly 
industrialising countries (NICs) of Turkey, Egypt and Morocco that have either 
no oil (Turkey and Morocco) or insufficient amount (Egypt) that cannot be 
relied on for long term growth strategy. All have sizable populations and 
reasonably strong agricultural sector with potential for future growth. In the 
poorest category are Sudan and Yemen that rely on mainly agriculture and 
some oil exports, and remittances of those who work in the oil rich countries 
of the region and elsewhere. It has to be noted that the above taxonomy 
should not be treated like a map with clear demarcated boundaries, but as a 
general guide as to the constraints and potentials of different MENA countries.  
The heterogeneity of the MENA is reflected in the incidence of poverty in 
different countries. Using the headcount poverty measure of a-dollar-a-day (or 
more) poverty is rife in the labour abundant and resource poor countries. But 
poverty is also present in the large resource rich and industrializing countries of 
Iran and Algeria (Iqbal, 2005, Messkoub, 2008). The incidence of poverty 
however is very sensitive to the head count poverty rate. For example in Egypt 
it rises from less than 5 per cent of population at a-dollar-a-day to above 40 per 
cent at two-dollar-a-day. (Iqban, 2005, p. 18) Whatever the merit or otherwise 
of poverty rate, this reveals the vulnerability of population to small shocks to 
their resource base. This suggests that traditional headcount poverty rates 
should be complemented by some indicator of vulnerability when it comes to 
the assessment of inter-generational support and social policy design. The 
other aspect of poverty is its regional spread. In all countries referred to in 
Iqbal’s (2005) study, rural headcount poverty rates are higher in rural areas than 
in urban areas.  
In the MENA region as elsewhere in the world, national and international 
migration has always been part of the household strategy to improve the life 
chances of its members. Table 2 provides a snap shot view of migration in 
MENA. Almost all labour abundant countries have sent large number of 
migrants to other countries, as indicated by the negative net migration figures. 
The reverse is true for labour deficit countries that have recorded positive net 
migration. It should be noted that these figures conflate international 
migration, whether within or outside the MENA region, and do not account 
for internal migration.  
In concluding this section several observations are in order. Demographic 
changes are taking place in the MENA region at a very fast pace – families are 
getting smaller, more families are of nuclear type, and less children are borne. 
In resource poor, labour abundant countries poverty is a major problem for a 
large section of population. Migration has been an important part of family and 
individual strategy to cope with poverty and improving life chances for the 
family and individual.  
The question of inter-generational support is in part about the 
demographic balance between generation within the family and society at large, 
and in part about resources of the family and societal distributional. 
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4 Family and inter-generational support 
In broadest terms a family’s economic resources are based on 
self/employment, property income (based on financial and other income 
earning assets), remittances, and state support in the form of direct income 
support or subsidy to basic consumption goods, health and education. A 
combination of these resources determine inter-generational support a family 
can offer to its members.  
In this paper we will not deal with property income, since information on 
distribution of assets is difficult to obtain. More important and judging by the 
incidence of poverty in the labour abundant countries, it can be safely assumed 
that the great majority of the people in these countries do not have access to 
assets that can generate sufficient income for them.  
Employment as a major source of family income has come under great 
stress in recent years. In 2010, unemployment in the MENA region was about 
10 per cent and the figure for women was 15 per cent. Youth unemployment is 
particularly high in the region. In  2010, it stood at 27 per cent, with the figure 
even higher among the educated youth. Female unemployment, in particular 
among the educated, is quite high: 40 per cent. Youth unemployment is not 
confined to the MENA region and many countries in Europe have record 
figures since the financial crisis of 2009. For example, Spain registered a youth 
unemployment rate of 46 per cent in 2012, Greece, 42 per cent and Cyprus 20 
per cent. (ILO, 2012) But what distinguishes youth unemployment in MENA 
is the fact that figures have been high well before the financial crisis and are a 
structural feature of the labour market in the region. Job creation has hardly 
kept pace with a rising youth population as they enter the labour force. 
(Messkoub, 2009) 
Another aspect of the labour market in the region is low pay and low 
return to labour, and vulnerability and insecurity of many jobs. In most MENA 
countries there are no unemployment benefits and most poor people cannot 
‘afford’ to be unemployed. The working poor are a sizable proportion of the 
working population. In late 1990s working poor accounted for 12 per cent of 
working population in Tunisia, with the figure rising to 30 per cent in Algeria, 
and staggering figures of 71 per cent in Egypt and 74 per cent in Yemen. (See 
table 3) The reasons for why people remain poor despite their hard work are 
varied and complex. Unequal distribution of assets and power play an 
important role in holding back the working poor from claiming their just and 
fair share of what they produce. Many small farmers do not have access to 
sufficient land or other agricultural inputs to improve their productivity. The 
self-employed people in urban areas often lack the resources to expand and 
improve their operations. In short low productivity is at the heart low return to 
labour in many sectors. At the same time weak trade unions and poor 
implementation of labour laws do not empower workers to ask for higher 
wages and better conditions. Absence of or low minimum wage is another 
reason for the low return to labour in many countries. 
But it is the structural reasons for low return to labour that should be of 
most concern to policy makers. Unequal distribution of land, low skills, low 
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capital investment, inefficient and often outdated technology will all lead to 
low productivity and low return. The financial and banking sector is also not 
geared to the needs of the small producers and the self-employed poor people. 
The micro-credit ‘revolution’ that was supposed to fill this gap has hardly 
changed the fortune of the great majority of the poor. What is needed is to 
tackle the problems of unequal distribution of power and assets that requires 
some fundamental political changes and more commitment by the state to 
improve education and skill levels as well as helping to upgrade technology in 
agriculture and industry. 
It should be clear that the great majority of families do not have adequate 
resources to meet their needs and provide adequate inter-generational support. 
Given the chronic and structural poverty in the labour abundant and resource 
poor countries inter-generational support has to go beyond families and take 
the broader perspective of societal inter-generational relations. In the labour 
deficit and resource rich countries the issue of inter-generational support 
within families poses several problems that again calls for a societal approach 
to inter-generational relationship. The first is the issue of income inequality in 
these countries. Only the small and very rich oil and gas producing countries 
can maintain sufficiently high income transfers to, as well as providing high 
level of health and educational services for their nationals to ensure adequate 
inter-generational support by families. In most of the larger oil exporting 
countries inequality in the distribution of income and assets, unemployment 
and inadequate public services have for long been the main reasons for public 
discontent. Lack of or inadequate democratic structure and governance to 
ensure accountability, participation and transparency have also seriously limited 
the voice and the negotiating power of the majority of population in MENA. 
Finally, there is the all-important issue of the rights of international migrants 
who have been of critical importance to the economy of labour deficit 
countries, and would become even more important in the future as population 
ages in these countries.  It is no exaggeration to state that the inter-generational 
support in areas of health, education, housing and care, to name but a few, in 
labour deficit countries cannot be maintained without the availability of 
migrant labour. It is in this context that we turn to societal inter-generational 
support and social policy.  
5 Social policy, families and inter-generational support 
At micro-level family is the main channel through which various types of inter-
generational support are provided, that contribute to production and re-
production of at micro and macro levels. Families however are not 
homogenous and are divided along social and economic lines that determine 
their capacity to provide inter-generational support. As noted earlier given the 
high incidence of poverty in many of the MENA countries and inadequacy of 
family resources there is a need for social policy measures that would 
supplement family resources and support the broad developmental agenda and 
ensure societal inter-generational support.  
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The most basic objective of any state intervention is to maintain and 
increase families’ resource base. In this context state intervention for inter-
generational support could be linked to market for: goods (e.g. provision of 
necessities such as health, education, housing and basic food stuff), labour (e.g. 
job creation and labour issues) and money (e.g. provision of credit for 
businesses).  
More specifically family budget constraint will be improved by first de-
commodifying (through regulation and intervention in the market) the basic 
necessities of life. De-commodification does not necessarily mean free 
provision of goods and services.  It could take different forms like rent control, 
subsidized medicine and basic food, free primary schools, free vaccination, etc. 
Second, by improving the human capital of family through improved health 
and education, employability and income earning opportunities of the families 
will increase. Third, by maintaining labour demand through job creation by 
private and public sector and increasing labour force participation of women 
families will have more secure earning opportunities through employment.  
Implementing the above policies would depend on the resource base of 
different countries. The resource rich and labour short countries obviously 
have an advantage over the others by having large foreign reserves and no 
financial constraint to finance universal welfare programmes. The issue of 
inter-generational support is not a problem, neither at family level nor at 
national level for these countries. Despite the existence of some youth 
unemployment in these countries, family resources and state spending are 
sufficient to maintain good standard of living for the young. But problems of 
these countries is rooted in their demography – they are short of labour to 
maintain and develop their economies almost in all sectors and skill levels, a 
gap that is filled by immigrant labour. With investment in education and skills 
in these countries, it is hoped that the shortage of skilled labour may somewhat 
be lessened but in other areas labour shortages will continue, particularly in the 
care, construction and service sector. It would also be expected that 
demographic transition and population ageing will increase the need for intern-
generational support, that with the most likely increase in the labour force 
participation of native women in some countries would generate a stable 
demand for migrant labour. In short inter-generational support in resource 
rich, labour deficit countries will require a stable and steady flow of migration.  
Whether this demand for labour will be fulfilled depends on the 
demographic situation and economic development in the labour abundant and 
the Asian countries (e.g. Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Philippines) that have been 
sending migrants to the MENA region for decades. Demographic transition is 
already underway in many of these countries that if combined with steady 
economic development will increase demand for labour and improve pay and 
conditions in these countries that would lower the propensity to migrate to the 
labour deficit MENA countries. To ensure a steady flow, the migrant receiving 
countries have to change their migration policy that would not only improve 
pay and conditions for the low skill migrants but also introduce some flexibility 
in the labour market. The current ‘guardianship’ (‘kefalat’) system that ties the 
immigrant to the sponsoring or ‘guardian’ (‘kafil’) employer has led to labour 
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market segmentation (defined as a market divided by non-competing groups) 
in labour deficit countries, where citizens and high skilled workers have far 
more rights and enjoy better living standards than the low skilled migrants in 
construction, service and other sectors. Migrants also have very little right to 
long term residence in the receiving countries. Low skill migrants could easily 
be abused by unscrupulous employers re-enforcing market segmentation.  
What is needed is an integrated labour market where labour law and rights 
could be applied to all in order to improve pay and conditions of immigrant 
labour. MENA countries should improve residency rights and make the 
‘kefalat’ system more flexible by allowing migrants to move between employers, 
at least after a minimum period of working for their sponsoring employer. This 
would improve the flexibility in the labour market and stabilise the migrant 
labour and bring the labour deficit countries closer to some of the best 
practices in other countries. Moreover, the labour deficit countries should also 
plan for permanent immigration in order to solve their long-term labour 
imbalance. It is highly unlikely that the labour deficit countries can close the 
gap between their labour demand and national labour supply in the near future 
and given their demographics. One of the best policies in the area of 
immigration is admitting migrants on the basis of skill shortages that would 
give the right to enter and reside temporarily that could in due course lead 
long-term residency. MENA may be far from a skill shortage immigration 
programme (as in Australia or US), but a debate has to start to improve the 
existing immigration system and plan for the labour demands of the future. 
The next group of countries to consider is resource rich and labour 
abundant countries. These countries have experienced improved human 
development for their nationals through basic programme in the areas of 
health (for example vaccination and basic preventive care), education, 
subsidized food, etc. The scope and scale of such provisions, however, vary 
greatly across different countries. Considering their large population and 
limited oil income most of them are dependent on high oil prices to fulfil their 
welfare plans.  
Ensuring that families can fulfil their inter-generational support in 
resource rich labour abundant countries governments have to maintain the real 
income of families by controlling inflation and cost of two major items of 
expenditure – housing and curative health care. This calls for prudent 
expenditure of the oil money in the country to avoid inflationary pressure, and 
partial de-commodification of health and housing. Another major concern in 
the medium term is high youth unemployment in these countries that requires 
active job creation policies, involving both public and private sector. 
Resource poor and labour abundant countries face many more hurdles 
than the other groups of countries. The human development record in the 
resource poor countries is varied and depends on the social class – obviously 
the richer classes enjoy better standard of living and higher human 
development. These countries face chronic foreign exchange constraints and 
fiscal problems that would limit their policy space to carry out much needed 
social policy measures in areas of health and education. Like elsewhere in the 
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MENA region, they also suffer from high youth unemployment.  How have 
families coped with their low living standards, poverty and vulnerability? 
As noted earlier, migration to richer countries in the region and beyond 
has helped to improve living standards for migrant sending families. 
Remittances have been an important contributor to family income and a 
source of foreign exchange for the government. Considering the level of 
poverty and high unemployment in the region families have limited scope for 
inter-generational support, without relying on state subsidies to basic food 
stuff, education and health. Social policy measures in these countries to ensure 
family based and societal inter-generational support here are no different from 
the resource rich and labour abundant countries, except that the needs are 
bigger and finances more limited in the resource poor countries. 
However, states could still do a lot in the resource poor countries by 
focusing on some key areas like universal and free preventive and primary 
health care, as well as school level education, and de-commodification through 
intervention in the market for curative health care, housing and higher 
education.  
Job creation and job protection should again be on the agenda. Whilst 
state in the resource poor countries have a lot less economic power than in the 
rich countries they can contribute to job creation by providing support to the 
private sector through appropriate tax and subsidy policies, and by training and 
educating the work force to meet the skill needs of the private sector.  
It is clear that countries of the region, resource rich or poor and labour 
abundant or short, have been related to one another for centuries through 
trade, migration, capital flows and certain common cultural traits such as 
religion, and in the case of most countries the Arabic language. These links do 
give a regional dimension to the issue of inter-generational support. Migration 
and remittance flows demonstrate that inter-generational support already relies 
on regional economic linkages.  
Yet, by all accounts, the region is very poorly integrated. Regional trade 
accounts for less than 10 percent of total trade in the Arab MENA, with the 
Maghreb countries having the lowest share of intra-regional non-oil 
merchandise trade. Low regional integration, according some studies, has led to 
the potential loss of 1-2 per cent growth of GDP. Higher GDP growth is 
particularly important for creating jobs for the 20 million or so unemployed 
people in the region and for the new comers who enter the labour market at an 
annual rate of 3.4 per cent. (World Bank, 2013, see also Hakimian and Nugent, 
2004)  
Strengthening existing regional links in relation to migration and labour 
mobility could contribute to inter-generational support. This could be helped 
by the integration of labour market across the region, initially by reducing 
regulation in hiring non-nationals, and by de-politicising migration of labour. 
The future generations are going to live in the same region and regional 
economic cooperation is needed if inter-generational support were to continue. 
15 
 
References 
Abdelrahman, M. M., 2001. State and civil society relations: the politics of Egyptian NGOs. 
PhD thesis. The Hague, NL: Institute of Social Studies,  
Auer, P. and Islam, R. (2006) Economic Growth, Employment, Competitiveness, and 
Labour Market Institutions. In: XX Global Competitiveness Report 2006-07. 
Basingstoke (UK): Palgrave Macmillan: The World Economic Forum., pp. 105-
116. 
Bongaarts, J. (2001) Household Size and Composition in the Developing World. New York: 
Population Council, report no. 144. 
Brandsma, J. and Bajourjee, D. (2004) Microfinance in the Arab World. New York: U.N. 
Capital Development Fund. 
Broude, Tomer (2010) ‘Regional Economic Integration in the Middle 
East and North Africa: A Primer,’ in C. Herrmann and J.P. Terhechte (eds.), (2010) 
European Yearbook of International Economic Law, European Yearbook of International 
Economic Law. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.  
Cavallo, E. and Izquierdo, A. (ed.) (2009) Dealing with an International Credit Crunch: 
Policy Responses to Sudden Stops in Latin America. Washington DC: Inter-American 
Development Bank.  
Cole, J. and Durham, D. (2007) Generation and Globalization: Youth, Age and Family in the 
New World Economy. Bloomington and Indianapolis, US: Indiana University Press. 
Financial Times (2010) ‘The dog that hasn’t barked’ in International Business Insight, p. 2. 
October 22.  
Iliffe, J. (1987) The African poor: a history. Cambridge: CUP. 
ILO (2005) World Employment Report 2004-05: Employment, Productivity and Poverty. 
Geneva: ILO. 
ILO (2006) Employment Poverty Linkages and Policies for Pro-poor Growth in Jordan (1990-
2003). Geneva: ILO. Second Draft. Mimeo (restricted document) 
ILO (2007) 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/yen/publ/recomm.htm#
3.4 (Accessed April 2007.) 
ILO (2009) Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM). Fifth edition. Geneva: 
ILO.  
ILO (2012) Global Employment Trends for Youth 2012. Geneva: ILO.  
(Accessed 20 May 2013: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_180976.pdf 
Iqbal, F. (2005) Sustaining Gains in Poverty Reduction and Human Development in the Middle 
East and North Africa. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Islam, I. (2005) Managing without Growth: Challenges Confronting the Syrian Labour Market. 
Geneva: ILO. Unpublished manuscript 
Islam, I. (2009) The Global Economic Crisis and Developing Countries: Transmission Channels, 
Fiscal and Policy Space and the Design of National Responses. Geneva: ILO, 
Employment Sector, Working Paper No. 36.          
Islam, R. (2004) The Nexus of Economic growth, Employment and Poverty Reduction: An 
Empirical Analysis. Geneva: ILO.  
16 
 
Karshenas, M. and  Moghadam. V. (eds.),  (2006) Social Policy in the Middle East and  
North Africa. Basingsoke (UK): Palgrave Macmillan and Geneva: UN Research 
Institute for Social Development.  
Khan, A. (2001) Employment Policies for Poverty Reduction. Geneva: ILO. 
Marx, K. (1990) Capital: a Critique of Political Economy. Translated by Ernest Mandel. 
Harmondsworth (UK): Penguin. 
McKinley, T. and Mehran, F. (2006) Strengthening the Employment Impact of an MDG-
Based Development Strategy for Yemen. Brazil: UNDP, International Poverty Centre, 
Country Study No. 4, September. 
MENAFN (2010) 
http://www.menafn.com/qn_news_story_s.asp?StoryId=1093365023 (Accessed 
8 August 2010) 
Messkoub, M. (2006) ‘Constitutionalism, Modernization and Islamization: A Political 
Economy of Social Policy in Iran’ in Karshenas and Moghadam (eds.), 2006. 
Messkoub, M. (2006)  Social Policy in Iran in the 20th Century,  Iranian Studies, 39(2).  
Messkoub, M. (2008) ‘Social Policy in Iran: Islamic or Secular?’ Policy World. Spring. 
Published by the British Social Policy Association.  
Messkoub, M. (2008) Economic Growth, Employment and Poverty in the Middle 
East and North Africa. ILO Working Paper Series, No. 19.  
Messkoub, M. (2009) ‘The Impact of Global Financial Crisis on Employment and 
Poverty in the MENA Region.’ Paper presented at the UN-ESCWA expert 
meeting on the global financial and economic crisis: The Social Impact and 
Responses in the Region. 8 December, Beirut, the Lebanon.  
Messkoub, M. (2011) ‘Crisis, Employment and Poverty in the Middle East and North 
Africa,' in Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, Rolph van der Hoeven and Arjan de Haan 
(eds), 2011. The Financial Crisis and Developing Countries. Cheltenham (UK): E.Elgar. 
Mina,Wasseem, 2010. ‘Institutional Reforms Debate and FDI Flows to MENA 
Region: Is Debate Relevant?’ 
Http://www.hecer.fi/Conferences/NCDE_2010/papers/Mina.pdf (Accessed 8 
August 2010)  
Miniesy/Nugent/ Yousef (2004) ‘Intra-Regional Trade in the Middle East: Past 
Performance and Future Potential’, in H. Hakimian and J. Nuggent (eds.), 2004. 
Trade Policy and Economic Integration in the Middle East and North Africa: Economic 
Boundaries in Flux. 
Mirkin, B. (2013) Arab Spring: Demographics in a region in transition. Arab Human 
Development Report Research Paper Series. New York: UNDP. 
Osmani, S.R. (2003) Exploring the Employment nexus: Topics in Employment and  Poverty. 
New York: UNDP and Geneva: ILO.  
Osmani, S.R. (2005) The Role of Employment in Promoting the Millenium Development Goals. 
New York: UNDP and Geneva: ILO.  
Richards, A. and Waterbury, J. (1990) A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class 
and Economic Development. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
Roudi-Fahimi, F. and Mederios, M. (2007) Challenges and Opportunities – The  Population 
of the Middle East and North Africa. Population Reference Bureau 
Population Bulletin, Vol. 62, No. 2, June. Washington, DC, US: Population Reference 
Bureau. 
17 
 
Salehi-Isfahani, Dj. (2010) Human Development in the Middle East and North Africa UNDP 
Human Development Research Paper 2010/26. NY, US: UNDP 
Seccombe, W. (1983) ‘Marxim and demography,’ New Left Review, No. 137.  
Subbarao, K. (2003) Systemic Shocks and Social Protection: Role and Effectiveness of Public 
Works Programs. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Social Protection Discussion 
Paper Series. 
Sundaram, K. and Tendulka, S.D. (2002) The working poor in India: Employment-Poverty 
linkages and Employment Policy Options.  Geneva: ILO. 
Tzannatos, Z. (2009) The Global Financial, Economic and Social Crisis and the Arab 
Countries: a Review of the Evidence and Policies for Employment Creation and Social 
Protection. Beirut: ILO Regional Office for Arab States. 
UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization] (2001) Integrating 
SME subglobal value chains: Towards partnership for development. Vienna: UNIDO. 
UNDP (2012) Arab Development Report 2011. Cairo: UNDP.  
UN (2013) World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision. NY, US: UN Population 
Division. (Accessed: 8 May 2013) 
World Bank (2009) 2008 Economic Development and Prospects: Regional Integration for Global 
Competitiveness. Middle East and North Africa Region. Washington DC: IBRD.  
World Bank (2011) World Development Report, 2011. 
World Bank (2013) ‘Trade Integration in the Middle East and North Africa’. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEX
T/EXTMNAREGTOPPOVRED/0,,contentMDK:22492441~pagePK:3400417
3~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:497110,00.html. (Accessed: 1 August 2013). 
 
 
